Tulsa Law Review
Volume 35
Issue 1 Native American Sovereignty Issues
Fall 1999

The Role, If Any, for the Federal Courts in the Cross-Boundary
Enforcement of Federal, State and Tribal Money Judgments
Robert Laurence

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert Laurence, The Role, If Any, for the Federal Courts in the Cross-Boundary Enforcement of Federal,
State and Tribal Money Judgments, 35 Tulsa L. J. 1 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol35/iss1/1

This Native American Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu.

Laurence: The Role, If Any, for the Federal Courts in the Cross-Boundary En

TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 35

Fall 1999

Number 1

SYMPOSIUM:
NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY
ISSUES
TILE ROLE, IF ANY, FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS

IN THE CROSS-BOUNDARY ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL, STATE AND TRIBAL MONEY JUDGMENTS
Robert Laurence*

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Problem Stated
Suppose that a tribal court issues a money judgment and the defendant does not

pay voluntarily.

Suppose also, that the defendant is judgment-proof on the

*. Robert A. Leflar Professorof Law, University of Arkansas. Thanks go to my colleague JohnJ. Watkins, whose
field is conflicts law and who, over the years, has shown a commendable interest in jurisdictional questions raised by
the presence of tribes among us. He read an early outline version of this paper, as I prepared for the 1998 Federal Bar
Association Indian Law Conference in Albuquerque, and read the penultimate version of the paper, just prior to
submission to the Tulsa Law Journal. On both occasions, he provided valuable insight and saved me several of the
indignities that await the non-proceduralist in the forbidding realm of federal jurisdiction. Remaining errors and
infelicities, of course, are my responsibility alone.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1999

1

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 35 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 1

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 35:1

reservation; he, she or it owns no non-exempt property over which the tribe exercises
any formal jurisdiction.' For this reason, the victorious plaintiff must present the
tribal court judgment to some off-reservation court in order to make the victory
complete.
Ordinarily, the court in which enforcement is sought will be the state court that
has jurisdiction over the defendant's property. Most coercive enforcement actions in
the country are brought in state, not federal court. In fact, there is no general federal

enforcement-of-judgment law; Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merely
incorporates state enforcement law into the federal rules.2

There are, however, three ways in which a federal court might find itself
involved in the enforcement of the tribal court judgment. First, and contrary to
expectations, the plaintiff might present thejudgment to the federal court sitting in the

state where the defendant's property lies. Second, the plaintiff might present the
judgment to the state court, and the defendant might sue in federal court to prevent
enforcement there. Third, having presented the tribal court judgment to the state
court, and having received an unwelcome reception there, the plaintiff might sue in
federal court to force the state court to recognize the judgment.
Conversely, the initial suit may be brought in state court, with judgment for the
plaintiff. Suppose the defendant again does not pay voluntarily and isjudgment-proof

off-reservation. This judgment ought to be presented to tribal court for enforcement.
However, a plaintiff suspicious of tribal court process might try to enforce the
judgment in the federal court for the district in which the reservation -- and hence the
property -- lies. Alternatively, the plaintiff might proceed in tribal court and the

defendant might sue in federal court to block tribal court enforcement. The third
possibility is that, the tribal court having refused to enforce the state court judgment,
the plaintiff might sue in federal court to force the tribe to enforce the off-reservation
judgment.

1. By"formaljurisdiction"ImeantribalciviIjudicialprocess. I acknowledge that, given thepropercircumstances,
a tribe may be able to exercise "informal jurisdiction" by flexing its economic muscle to persuade the defendant to pay.
An example these days might be where a member ofa gaming tribe, employedby the tribes advertising agency, recovers
judgment in tribal court over an employment dispute. Technically speaking, the tribal court may have no "formal
jurisdiction" over any on-reservation property of the agency, there being none. However, one could speculate that for
the defendant to turn its back on the tribal court order would put its contract with the tribe at risk.
There is also the question of the tribe's ability to reach intangible property of the defendant by declaring its location to
be on-reservation with the defendant or another, under the so-called debt-follows-the-debtor rule. See generallyRobert
Laurence, The Off-Reservation Garnishmentofan On-ReservationDebtandRelatedlssuesin the Cross-Boundary
Enforcement ofMoney Judgments, 22 AM. INDIANL. REv. 355 (1998).
Despite the economic realities revealed by the example, and the important complexities involved with intangible
property, this article deals only with the "formal jurisdiction" of the tribe over tangible personal property, and the
enforcement of money judgments against same.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a) states:
Process to enforce ajudgment for the payment of money shall be a writ of execution, unless the court directs otherwise.
The procedure on execution, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of ajudgment, and in proceedings on and in
aid of execution shall be in accordance with the practice and procedure of the state in which the district court is held,
existing at the time the remedy is sought, except that any statute of the United States governs to the extent that it is
applicable. In aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor or a successor in interest when that interest
appears of record, may obtain discovery from any person, including the judgment debtor, in the manner provided in
these rules or in the manner provided by the practice of the state in which the district court is held.
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Many scholarly articles have touched on the issues of cross boundary
enforcement of judgments when the enforcing courts are state or tribal courts.
Rather, the question addressed here is what, if any, role the federal courts should play
in this process, either as the court being asked directly to enforce the judgment, or as
the court in which a collateral attack is made on some other court's willingness or
unwillingness to enforce a judgment from across a reservation boundary. In
conclusion, without some substantial change in the laws governing their jurisdiction,
federal courts will have only a minor role to play. As a major role for the federal
courts makes sense, these changes should be made.
B. A PreliminaryNote on Terminology
I begin by defining some terms:
1. Direct Collateral Review
This strangely contradictory term describes those situations when a federal court

3. See generallyBarbaraAnnAtwood, Identity andAssimilation:ChangingDefinitionsofTribalPowerover
Children, 83 MINN. L. REv. 927 (1999); Judith V. Royster, Stature and Scrutiny: Post-ExhaustionReview of Tribal
CourtDecisions,46 U. KAN. L. REv. 241 (1998); Nell Jessup Newton, TribalCourtPraxis: One Year in the Life of
Twenty Indian Tribal Courts,22 AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 285 (1998); Robert Laurence, Full Faithand Creditin Tribal
Courts: An Essay on Tribal Sovereignty, Cross-Boundary Reciprocity and the Unlikely Case of Eberhard v.
Eberhard,28 N.M. L. REV. 19 (1998); Robert Laurence, The Off-Reservation Garnishmentof an On-Reservation
Debt and Related Issues in the Cross-BoundaryEnforcement of Money Judgments, 22 AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 355
(1998);MonicaE. Henderson, Child Custody: The Indian Child WelfareAct, 35 U.LouIsvILuEJ.FAM.L. 821 (1997);
Frank Pommersheim, Tribal CourtJurisprudence: A Snapshotfrom the Field, 21 VT. L. REV. 7 (1996); Daina B.
Garonzik, FullReciprocityfor Tribal Courtsfrom a FederalCourts Perspective: A ProposedAmendment to the
FullFaithand CreditAct,45 FioRYLJ. 723 (1996); Robert Laurence, The BothersomeNeedforAsymmetry in Any
FederallyDictated Rule of Recognition for the Enforcement of Money Judgments across Indian Reservation
Boundaries,27 CoN. L. REV. 979 (1995); Darby L. Hoggatt, The Wyoming Tribal Full Faith and CreditAct:
Enforcing Tribal Judgments and ProtectingTribal Sovereignty, 30 LAND & WATER L. REv. 531 (1995); Robert
Laurence,Dominant-SocietyLawandTribal CourtAdjudication,25 N.M.L.REv. 1(1995); Patricia A. Harris, Child
Custody: ComancheIndian Tribe v. Hovis, 33 U.Lousrv1.LEJ.FAM.L. 186 (1995); P.S. Deloria&RobertLaurence,
Negotiating Tribal-StateFull Faithand CreditAgreements:The Topology ofthe Negotiationand theMerits of the
Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365 (1994); Richard E. Ransom, et al., Recognizing and Enforcing State and Tribal
Judgments: A Roundtable Discussionof Law, Policy and Practice, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 239 (1993); Frank
Pommersheim, Liberation,Dreams,and HardWork: An Essay on Tribal CourtJurisprudence,1992 WIs.L.REV.
411 (1992); JenniferL. Guy, Civilprocedure: Barbryv. Dauzat,30 U.LOS0vLLEJ.FAM.L. 681 (1992); BJ. Jones,
Tribal Considerationsin Comity and Full Faithand CreditIssues, 68 N.D. L. REv. 689 (1992); Jon Jensen, Note,
Fredericksv. Eide-KirschmannFord: The Vehicle to Enforcing Tribal CourtCivil Judgments,68 N.D.L. REV. 675
(1992); Robert Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments acrossIndian Reservation Boundaries: Full Faithand
Credit,Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L. REv. 589 (1990); Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and
the FederalUnion, 26 WILNt.AEfiEL. REV. 841 (1990); Barbara Ann Atwood, FightingoverIndian Children: The
Uses andAbuses ofJurisdictionalAmbiguity,36 UCLAL. REV. 1051 (1989); William V. Vetter, Of TribalCourts
and "Territories"-- Is FulIFaithand CreditRequired?,23 CAL W. L.REV. 219 (1987). Two student notes appeared
earlyon,seeGordonK.WrightNote,Recognition ofTribalDecisionsin State Courts,37 STAN.L. REv. 1397 (1985)
and John T. Moshier, Comment, Conflicts between State and TribalLaw: The Application of the Full Faith and
Credit Legislation to Indian Tribes, 1981 ARIz. ST. L.J. 801. For the earliest' treatment, see Fred L. Ragsdale,
Problemsin the Application ofFull Faithand CreditforIndian Tribes, 7 N.M. L. REv. 133 (1977). It is interesting
to note that, from this wealth ofdiscussion the Ninth Circuit in Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997),
choose to cite only the 1985 Stanford case note, see id. at 808.
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is asked by the plaintiff to make a direct appraisal of the proceedings in a tribal court
before judgment. The review is "collateral" in the sense that it is not being done on
appeal from the tribal court proceeding, through the tribal appellate court system, but
collaterally in the federal court system. The review is "direct" in the sense that the
challenge is directly to the power of the tribal court to issue the judgment, or to the
way that power was exercised.
There are traditionally three kinds of direct collateral review:
a. Habeas Corpus
The Indian Civil Rights Act4 (ICRA) permits those detained by tribal criminal
justice systems to seek review of the detention in federal court.' Habeas Corpus is
beyond the scope of this article, as it deals only with criminal or quasi-criminal
detentions.
b. Martinez-style ICRA Review
The Indian Civil Rights Act imposes certain Constitution-like restrictions on
tribal governments, including tribal courts. For ten years following the passage of
the act in 1968, tribes were regularly sued under the ICRA, often by their own
members and often over what might be called "political questions," such as electoral
redistricting.7 In Santa ClaraPueblov. Martinez,8 the United States Supreme Court
held that the ICRA, even while imposing these restrictions, did not create a federal
civil cause of action for violations of them. Hence Martinez-style direct collateral
attacks on tribal court proceedings are not permitted under the present state of the
law.
c. Strate-style Common Law Review
Almost simultaneously with finding that the Indian Civil Rights Act (the
congressional enactment meant to restrict the operation of tribal governments) to be
unenforceable, on the civil side in federal court, the Supreme Court also determined
that the federal common law imposed restrictions and was enforceable by civil actions
in federal court. The earliest of these common law cases, Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe,9 decided only a few months before Martinez, was a direct collateral

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1983).
See id. § 1303.
See id. § 1302 (1983).
See, e.g., White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973).
436 U.S. 49 (1978).
435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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attack on the criminaljurisdiction of a tribal court over non-Indians. The Court held
that the ICRA's habeas corpus provision could be used to enforce the Court's
common law restrictions." Montanav. UnitedStates" extended Oliphantto the civil
side of tribal jurisdiction, though without the blanket prohibition of the exercise of
jurisdiction over non-Indians, and not in the case of tribal court adjudication. Strate
v. A-1 Contractors,Inc.," a case involving a white-on-white tort, applied Montana
to a direct collateral attack in federal court on a tribal court civil judgment for money
damages. The Court permitted the collateral attack, and found the tribal court
judgment to be void. 3
Thus, Strate was a successful direct collateral review in federal court of the
power of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, while Martinez
was an unsuccessful direct collateral review in federal court of the power of the Santa
Clara Pueblo. Audrey Martinez attempted a statutory attack and was denied, while
A-1 Contractors tried a common law attack and won, an irony that has not gone
without notice. 14 NationalFarmersUnion v. Crow Tribe 5 involved direct collateral
review, where the federal court plaintiff, who had been the tribal court defendant, was
seeking a federal stay of the on-reservation enforcement by tribal officers of the tribal
court plaintiffs tribal court judgment.
Hence, of the three types of "direct collateral review" mentioned above, only the
Strate-type applies on the civil side of the tribal court's jurisdiction; habeas corpus
is criminal and Martinez denied the collateral attack. Furthermore, the Court in
NationalFarmer'sUnionrequired that Strate-stylecollateral review in federal court
6
await the exhaustion of all tribal court remedies.'
Academic commentators tend to dislike Oliphant and its progeny, including
Montana and Strate,which limit or destroy tribal jurisdiction under a very nebulous
federal common law. These same commentators tend to admire Martinez and
National FarmersUnion, which cautioned the federal courts to tread carefully on
tribal court jurisdiction. It has always been unclear whether those academic views
are shared by persons who live under tribal jurisdiction. One suspects that the
Supreme Court has fulfilled those persons' practical wishes more than the theoretical
needs of the academics. This article will not explore directly this well-trodden
ground, though other aspects of these cases will be discussed below.
2. Indirect Collateral Review
Whenever a judgment is presented for enforcement in a court other than the one

10. See id. at 195.
11. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
12. 520 U.S. 438(1997).
13. Id. at 439.
14. See William C. Canby, Jr., The Status ofIndianTribes in American Law Today, 62NVAsH. L. REv. 1 (1987).
Judge Canby wrote not in terms of Martinez and Strate, but Martinez and Oliphant,but the point is the same.
15. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
16. See id. at 845.
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that rendered the judgment, a form of collateral review takes place. Even when both
the rendering court and the receiving court are state courts, bound by the strict
mandates of full faith and credit, 7 there is a narrow form of collateral review. Not
all state court judgments are entitled to full faith and credit and the receiving court is
permitted a review of certain aspects of the judgment rendered. When full faith and
credit does not apply, prototypically when a state court is asked to enforce a judgment
from a foreign nation, the collateral review is more expansive, touching on many
aspects of the judgment, as well as the law and procedure that gave rise to it.
The review involved in these kinds of cases is "indirect collateral review," where
the challenge to tribal power is done in, or is related to, an off-reservation civil
enforcement action. The two most commonly discussed and litigated types of indirect
collateral review are the most straightforward cross-boundary enforcement cases.
One of these is where off-reservation enforcement of a tribal court judgment is sought
in state court, and the other where on-reservation enforcement of a state judgment is
sought in tribal court. The law with respect to these common hypotheticals is
mentioned below in Part II(C), but, as they are the ones most often discussed in the
literature, and since they do not involve federal court review, the discussion here will
be mercifully short.
Strate and National Farmers Union would have involved indirect collateral
review in federal court if the challenge to tribal power had come in an off-reservation
enforcement action. The issues involved had these tribal court plaintiffs sought
federal court enforcement of the tribal court judgment are discussed in Part III,
below.
There is also the opposite kind of indirect collateral review, where a state court
plaintiff attempts to use the federal court to enforce a state court judgment onreservation. Here, the first question involves the collateral review, as the federal
court inspects the state court judgment to see if it passes muster and is enforceable.
The second question is one of the federal court's power to enforce any judgment on
reservation. These issues will be discussed in Part IV, below.
3. Doubly Indirect Collateral Review
"Doubly indirect collateral review" involves that unwieldy situation where all
three court systems are implicated by the enforcement action. Here, the judgment
arises in one jurisdiction, for instance, a tribal court. The defendant does not pay
voluntarily and the plaintiff seeks enforcement in the state court system. The
defendant then seeks the protection of the federal court against the state enforcement
of the tribal judgment. National Farmers Union would have involved a doubly
indirect collateral review of this type if the insurance company had sued in federal
court to halt Sage's suit in state court to enforce the tribal court judgment. Or, if the
state court refused to enforce Sage's tribal court judgment, and Sage sued in federal

17.

U.S. CoNsT. Art IV, § 1. The Clause requires an implementing statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
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court to compel state enforcement. These issues are discussed in Parts V(A) and (B),
below.
Another kind of doubly indirect collateral review in federal court is the other
side of the National Farmers Union coin, where the plaintiff recovers an offreservation judgment and seeks on-reservation enforcement, which is either refused
or granted by the tribal court. Now, the original plaintiff sues in federal court seeking
to compel, or the original defendant sues to block, the tribal court's enforcement of
the state court judgment. These issues are discussed in Parts VI(A) and (B), below.
This article will conclude in Part VII with some recommendations of where the law
ought to go and some predictions of where it will go.

II. SOME BACKGROUND, DISCUSSING THE CASES NOT DIRECTLY BEFORE Us
Even though the topic of this article is the enforcement of judgments across
Indian reservation boundaries, we begin with some non-Indian law, excessive nonIndian law, possibly, for some. While it is true that tribes are neither states nor
foreign countries,' 8 the American law with respect to the enforcement of judgments
across state and foreign borders provides necessary background for the present
discussion. Furthermore, any discussion of cross-boundary enforcement in the United
States must begin with the prototype hypothetical, where ajudgment is being enforced
across state lines.
A. The Non-Indian Cross-BoundaryCases, In Which Federal Courts are Usually
Not Involved

1. Pure Full Faith and Credit between States
The hypothetical is this:
AB vs. CD in Texas state court, judgment for AB.
Texas appeal; affirmed.
AB vs. CD in Arkansas state court to enforce the Texas state court
judgement.
Here is full faith and credit in its most pristine form. The Arkansas court must,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and the United States Constitution, recognize the Texas
judgment. As the Supreme Court recently stated in Baker v. General Motors

18.

See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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Corporation19:
Regardingjudgments... the full faith and credit obligation is exacting.
A final judgment in one state, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory
authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land.2"
The exceptions are few: (1) Arkansas must only give the judgment the force that
Texas would, so if it is unenforceable in Texas, it is unenforceable in Arkansas;2 1 (2)
Texas must have had personal and subject matter jurisdiction over CD under federal
constitutional principles; 2 (3) the Texas judgment must not have been satisfied;' and
(4) penal judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit, though judgments for
punitive damages are.24
Most importantly, perhaps, under the full faith and credit doctrine, Arkansas
may not refuse to recognize the Texas judgment because of its own strong public
policy.' In Baker, the Supreme Court described the relationship between the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the public policy of the receiving jurisdiction (called the
"forum state" in the quotation below) this way:
A court may be guided by the forum State's "public policy" in
determining the law applicable to a controversy. But our decisions
support no roving "public policy exception" to the full faith and credit
due judgments. In assuming the existence of a ubiquitous "public
policy exception" permitting one State to resist recognition of another
State's judgment, the District Court in the Bakers' wrongful death
action... misread our precedent. "The full faith and credit clause is
one of the provisions incorporated into the Constitution by its framers
for the purpose of transforming an aggregation of independent,
sovereign States into a nation." We are "aware of [no] considerations
of local policy or law which could rightly be deemed to impair the force
and effect which the full faith and credit clause and the Act of Cofigress
require to be given to [a money] judgment outside the state of rendi' '2
tion.

19. 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
20. Id. at 233. See generally Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit -- The Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945); Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, "PublicPolicy" in the Conflict
of Laws, 56 CoLuM.L.REv. 969 (1956); Ruth B. Ginsburg,Judgments in Search ofFullFaith and Credit: The Last.
in-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 HARv. L. REv. 798 (1969).
21. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 233. In particular, Justice Kennedy referred to "the undoubted principle that courts
need give a prior judgment no more force or effect that the issuing State gives it .... " Id. at 247 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). This statement should not be read to suggest that a receiving court must give exactly the same force or
effect to a judgment as the issuing state would. As mentioned below, the receiving state will use its own execution
process for the enforcement ofjudgment, after applying its own statutes oflimitations and exemption laws. See infra
text accompanying note 27.
22.
See Baker, 522 U.S. at 233. See also Karen Nelson Moore, Collateral Attack on Subject Matter
Jurisdiction: A Critique of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CoRNELLL. REv. 534 (1981).
23. See generally, RoBERTA. LEFLAR, ErtAL, AMERICAN CONFUcILAW 215-17,221-26 (4th ed. 1986).

24.

Id.

25.
26.

See Baker, 522 U.S. at 232-37; LEFLAR, supra note 23 at § 75.
Baker, 522 U.S. at 233-34 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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In the actual enforcement of the Texas judgment, however, Arkansas will use
its own execution process, not Texas', and will apply its own exemption laws and
statutes of limitations. The Baker court stated:
Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that States must adopt
the practices of other States regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments. Enforcement measures do not travel
with the sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such measures
remain subject to the even-handed control of forum law. Orders
commanding action or inaction have been denied enforcement in a sister
State when they purported to accomplish an official act within the
exclusive province of that other State or interfered with litigation over
which the ordering State had no authority.2 7

2. Pure Comity, In the Cross-National-Borders Situation
The hypothetical is this one:
AB vs. CD in Hungarian court, judgment for AB.
Hungarian appeal, affirmed.
AB vs. CD in Arkansas state court to enforce the Hungarian judgment.
Full faith and credit, of course, does not apply to judgments from foreign
nations. s Instead, comity, a more flexible rule, obtains permitting the receiving court
greater discretion in determining whether to recognize the judgment.29 Instead of the
very limited circumstances of non-recognition of full faith and credit mentioned
above, the standard principles of comity allow for a denial of recognition in four
major classes of cases. First, where the judgment seriously offends local public
policy; second, where the judgment is not in conformity with fundamental procedural
fairness; third, where the judgment was procured by fraud; or finally, where the
judgment was issued by a court without proper subject matter and personal
jurisdiction.3"
The usual case cited in an explanation of comity is Hilton v. Guyot,3 1 but that
case does not apply directly to the current hypothetical. In Hilton,the Supreme Court
set the rule of comity for federal courts when a foreign nation judgment is presented

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 235-36 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
See LEFLAR, supra note 23 at 251.
See id. at 250.
See Ransom et al., supranote 3 at 250-52 (remarks of Professor Newton).
159U.S. 113 (1895).
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for enforcement, but did not require that the same rule be used in state courts. 32
Hence, Arkansas's version of comity will govern the recognition of the case,
Roughly one half of the states have adopted the statutory Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgment Recognition Act (UFM-JRA). 33 The UFM-JRA, in turn, embodies
much of the law of Hilton. For instance, section 4 provides for three mandatory
reasons for non-recognition, and six discretionary reasons:
(a) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not
receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to
defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is
based is repugnant to the public policy of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive
judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement
between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be
settled otherwise than by proceedings in that court; or

32. See SuccessMotivationInst.ofJapan, Ltd. v.SuccessMotivationInstitute, Inc., 966 F.2d 1007, 1009-10 (5th
Cir. 1992); Sompotex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971); McCord v. Jet Spray
International Corp., 874 F.Supp. 436 (D.Mass. 1994). As the citations indicate, these cases dealt with the related
question of whether Hilton's federal rule of comity should apply in a federal diversity case, under Erie, holding that it
does not. See supratext accompanying notes 53-56. See also Bruce J. Downey III, Note, Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in FederalCourts,49 N.C. L. REv. 747 (1971). Dr. Leflar stated the proposition in the text directly, but
without citation of authority, other than his estimable own: "The doctrine [of retaliation found in Hilton] has received
scant approval from commentators and is not binding on state courts." LEFLAR, supra note 23 at 25 1.
33. UNtF.FOREiGNMoNEYJUDGEMNTRECOGNmONACr, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1986).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol35/iss1/1

10

Laurence: The Role, If Any, for the Federal Courts in the Cross-Boundary En

1999]

ENFORCEMENT OFMONEY JUDGMENTS

(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the
foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of that
action. 34
In states like Arkansas that have not adopted the UFM-JRA, state common law
will apply. 35 While the common law of comity is in large part captured by the UFMJRA, one of the principal differences between the two in some states is that the former
may require enacting states to retaliate against foreign countries that do not enforce
the enacting state's judgments.3 6 Actually, the uniform version of the UFM-JRA does
not require retaliation, nor does it even seem to permit it, as retaliation is not listed
under section 4's discretionary reasons for non-recognition. However, some enacting
jurisdictions have added a non-uniform variation that permits retaliation. For
example, North Carolina's version of section 4(b) adds to the six discretionary
reasons for non-recognition quoted above, a seventh, which reads:
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if:

would not
(7) The foreign court rendering the judgment
37
State.
this
of
judgment
comparable
a
recognize
State common law might, or might not, have such a requirement.
Thus, in states that use retaliatory comity by statute or common law, a court
may refuse to enforce a foreign nation judgment even though the judgment otherwise
meets the requirements of comity, as above. For example, a judgment that does not
offend local sensibilities, was granted in conformity with fundamental procedural
fairness, was not procured by fraud, and was issued by a court with proper subject
matter and personal jurisdiction might still be unenforceable in a state that retaliates.
The refusal by the receiving court to enforce the judgment, in other words, will not
be based on any particular shortcoming of the judgment presented for enforcement,
but rather on the refusal of the rendering jurisdiction to enforce prior judgments
presented to it by the receiving jurisdiction.
Dr. Leflar thought that there should be no retaliation doctrine: "It has no
appreciable tendency to induce a change in the foreign nation's law."3 Judge Learned
Hand, commenting on Hilton and retaliation, wrote:
[The Supreme Court] certainly did not mean to hold that an American

34. UNIF. FOREiGNMONEYJuDGE ENTRECOGNmONAcr, § 4,13 U.L.A. 268 (1986). See also RESrATMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN REiATIONS LAW OFTiE UNITED STATES § 482(1986).
35.

See William C. Sturm, Enforcement of ForeignJudgments, 95 COLuuM.L-. 200 (1990).

36.
37.

See, e.g., Ducharme v. Hunnewell, 585 N.E.2d 321 (Mass. 1992).
N.C.GEN.STAT. § 1C-1804. Massachusetts and Texas have similar non-uniform variations, see MASS GEN.

LAWS ANN. ch. 235 § 23A (West 1986) and TEx. Civ. CODE ANN. § 36.005 (West 1997).
38. See LEFLAR, supranote 23 at 250 (citing Kurt H. Nadelmann, ReprisalsagainstAmericanJudgments?, 65

HAR.L.REV. 1184(1952)). ProfessorNadelmann was the Reporter ofthe UFM-JRA. Dr. Leflar may have influenced
the drafters of the UFM-JRA to avoid retaliation; the Official Comment to § 3 states that "[tlhe method of enforcement
will be that of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1948 .... " Dr. Leflar was the reporter of that
uniform act. See generally Robert A. Leflar, Act 34: The New Uniform ForeignJudgmentsAct, 3 ARK. L. REV. 402
(1949).
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court was to recognize no obligations or duties arising elsewhere until
it appeared that the sovereign of the locus reciprocally recognized
similar obligations existing here. That doctrine, I am happy to say, is
not part of American jurisprudence.3 9
Furthermore, it can be seen that retaliation penalizes a plaintiff who owns a judgment
unobjectionable on its merits for aspects of the rendering jurisdiction's law unrelated
to the issuance of the plaintiffs judgment.
The doctrine of comity, as applicable in a state court asked to enforce a foreignnation money judgment, is a flexible one that may allow non-recognition for reasons
having nothing to do with the judgment itself. It has none of the compulsory nature
of full faith and credit. Nevertheless, as Dr. Leflar noted, modem conflicts
jurisprudence has turned the receiving state's inquiry away from substance and
toward procedure:
Ordinarily American courts do give effect to foreign judgments, and
refuse to do so only in extraordinary situations.... [M]ere differences
in local law do not necessarily give rise to the strong policy objections
which justify refusal to recognize foreign judgments. Difference in
strong public policy among civilized states today should not readily be
found when judgments have been rendered under circumstances which
satisfy our own basic concepts of due process of law.40
We may now turn to the application of these principles of full faith and credit
and comity in federal courts.
B. FederalCourts in Non-Tribal EnforcementActions

1. Federal Courts and Full Faith and Credit for State Court Judgments
The hypothetical is this:
AB vs. CD in Texas state court, judgment for AB.
Texas appeal; affirmed.
AB vs. CDin Arkansas federal district court to enforce the Texas state court
judgment.
When this hypothetical is presented to those who practice and teach conflicts
law, the common response is "Why federal court?" Conceedingly, most cross-stateboundary enforcement issues arise in state courts, not federal courts. In fact, as there
is no general federal enforcement-of-judgment law, but rather only a referral in Rule
69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to state law, one has to work hard to
explain the hypothetical. First that explanation; then the solution to the hypothetical.

39. Direction derDisconto-Gesellschaftv. United States Steel Corp., 300 F.741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), afd, 267
U.S. 22 (1925).
40. LEFLAR, supra note 23 at 251-52.
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Under full faith and credit, the enforceability of the Texas judgment in Arkansas
depends on whether there was proper jurisdiction in Texas. If CD appeared in the
Texas proceedings, then any objections to Texas's jurisdiction were either litigated
or waived. In either case, they cannot be raised collaterally in the enforcement
proceeding.4 Suppose instead that the original Texas judgment was by default, and
CDnow wishes to raise thejurisdictional issue in the enforcement action in Arkansas.
This will be an InternationalShoe, "minimum contacts," "fair play and substantial
justice" inquiry.4 2 Suppose further that AB, the Texas plaintiff, had been reaching
long to establish jurisdiction in the Texas court over the Arkansas defendant; perhaps
CD's contacts with Texas were barely "minimum," and arguably non-existent. It is
understandable that, in the collateral review that will exist in the enforcement action,
AB would want to reduce as much as possible the "homecourt advantage" that he
fears CD will have in Arkansas. AB chooses the federal district court for that

purpose, even though he knows that once the court holds the Texas judgment entitled
to recognition in Arkansas, the rest of the process will go on under Arkansas law.
That will include the application of Arkansas exemption law, where one can get
pretty seriously "homecourted. "' Nonetheless, it is understandable that AB might
wish to proceed in federal district court.
Now, does the Arkansas federal district court have jurisdiction? Yes, if the
parties are of diverse citizenship and the Texas judgment is for more than $75,000, 44
otherwise, no. The fact that the plaintiffs Texas judgment is entitled to full faith and
credit in Arkansas under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 does not, by itself, mean that the federal
court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Supreme Court has said:
[T]he [full faith and credit] clause has nothing to do with the conduct

41. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assoc., 283 U.S. 522(1931). See also Hazen Research Inc. v.
Omega Minerals, Inc., 497 F.2d 151 (5" Cir. 1974), which explains the law quite clearly:
Where the defendant has appeared in the original action, the judgment in that cause is resjudicata on the issue of
personal jurisdiction, whether the defendant actually litigated the question or merely permitted it to pass without
objection. Defense to an adverse judgment on the basis of the failure of the rendering court to obtain jurisdiction of the
person is therefore foreclosed, unless the peculiar law of the state in which thejudgment was rendered would honor such
a collateral attack. In those cases, however, in which the defendant makes no appearance and the judgment goes by
default, the defendant may defeat subsequent enforcement in another forum by demonstrating that the judgment issued
from a court lacking personal jurisdiction.
Id. at 153 (citations omitted).
42. See International Shoe Co. v.vashington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Hazen Research, 497 F.2d at 155 (5th Cir.
1974).
43. Arkansas has a generous homestead exemption, see ARK. CoNST. art. 9, §§ 3-5, though less generous for the
owners of spacious homesteads than Florida's, South Dakota's, and Texas', among others. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4,
S.D. CODFED LAWS § 43-31-1, TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001, all of which provide for unlimited homestead
exemptions. So, in the hypothetical given, AB is unlikely to be unfairly surprised, nor "homecourted" by Arkansas's
homestead exemption. Nevertheless, the point is more general than this: exemption laws in particular may be read by
courts to protect debtors in ways that seem outlandish to creditors from out oftown. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption
Limitations: A Tale of Two Solutions,71 AN.BANxn.LJ. 221,235, nn. 67-69 (1997)(discussing the use ofgenerous
homestead laws by corporate raider Paul Bilzerian, baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn, and Texas Governor John
Connally).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See, e.g., Hazen Research, 497 F.2d at 151. The court in Hazen observed:
In this case plaintiffhas foundedjurisdiction on diversity of citizenship, and we have the rather anomalous situation of
a federal diversity court deciding a controversy in which Congress has, by the exercise of its express and implied powers,
federalized all relevant legal questions - a diversity case in which there are no issues of forum state law.
Id. at 154 n.l.
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of individuals or corporations; and to invoke the rule which it prescribes does not make
a case arising under the Constitution or laws of
45
the United States.
Suppose diversity jurisdiction exists. The cause of action in the federal court
will then be the Texas judgment because the underlying cause of action was merged
with the judgment in the Texas proceeding and can no longer be sued upon. 6 Federal
full faith and credit principles apply, notwithstanding Erie.47 Alternatively, some
would suggest that even if the federal court should use Arkansas law under Erie, a
part of Arkansas law is the federal requirement of full faith and credit, found in 28
U.S.C. § 1738.48 Either way, the Arkansas federal district court will apply the
requirements of full faith and credit to determine if the judgment should be
recognized. If full faith and credit compels recognition, Rule 69 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure instructs that Arkansas process (including Arkansas exemptions
and Arkansas statutes of limitations) shouldbe used to enforce thejudgment. 49 These
Arkansas procedures will be executed by the federal marshal, not the county sheriff,
but otherwise enforcement is under state law.
2. Federal Courts and Comity for Foreign-Nation Judgments
The hypothetical is:
AB vs. CD in Hungarian state court, judgment for AB.
Hungarian appeal; affirmed.
AB vs. CD in Arkansas federal district court to enforce the Hungarian
judgment.
Here, federal alienage diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a )(2) is
likely to exist, unless the judgment is small.5 If the parties are not diverse, federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 will exist only if there is some
underlying federal issue, for example, where the suit is related to a subject of federal
5
arbitration rules. '
First, assume that only diversity jurisdiction exists in federal court. The cause
of action will be the Hungarian judgment, and Arkansas law will apply under Erie.
Suggestions have been made in the cases that federal enforcement of judgment law

45. Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48 (1904). See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHTErAL, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JURISDICIION AND RELAED MATERS § 3521 (2d ed. 1984).
46. See LEFAR, supra note 23 at 222-23.
47. See Hazen Research, 497 F.2d at 153 n.1. See also LEFLAR, supranote 23 at 222.
48. See LEFIAR, supra note 23 at 222.
49. The Statute ofLimitations question is maderather complex because ofthe Supreme Court's holding in Watkins
v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188 (1966). This casepermittedthe states tohave statutesoflimitationsthat discriminatedagainst
out-of-state judgments so long as the states also permitted the plaintiff to return to the original forum state to "freshen
up" thejudgment so as to satisfy thereceiving state's short statute of limitations See id.at 189-190. See, e.g., Durham
v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, Child Support Enforcement Unit, 912 S.W.2d 412,414 (1995).
50. See John J. Watkins, The "Other"Diversity: FederalAlienageJurisdiction, 1997 ARK. L. NoMls 77.
51. See 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1999); see also Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B. 825 F.2d 709 (2d Cir.
1987).
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should apply in diversity cases. 52 In fact, Hilton v. Guyot,53 the case establishing the
federal rule of comity, was a diversity case, but that case predates ErieRailroadCo.
v. Tompkins 4 and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.55, which
together serve to apply state conflicts law in federal diversity cases.56
If the federal court's jurisdiction is based on federal question jurisdiction under
U.S.C. § 1331, then the federal rule of comity applies, regardless of the local state
rule. This is thepreciseholding of Hilton v. Guyot.5 7 As mentioned above, in Hilton,
the Supreme Court appeared to make retaliation a part of the federal common law,
but lower federal courts have been able to avoid that requirement when it has been
deemed desirable to do so.58
C. The Casesin State or Tribal Courts Involving Judgments CrossingReservation
Boundaries

We now move finally to American Indian law, though not yet to our final
destination. Before tackling the question of the role of the federal courts in the crossreservation-boundary enforcement of judgments, it is required, for reasons that will
become clear, to relate the law when enforcement is sought in state or tribal courts,
beginning with the former.

52. InHerMajestythe QueeninRightoftheProvince ofBritish Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161 (9thCir.
1979), the Province sued in Oregon federal district court, seeking to enforce a tax claim against the defendants. The
district court dismissed under the so-called "revenue rule," that is to say that one jurisdiction does not enforce the tax
laws of another jurisdiction, 433 F.Supp. 410 (D. Ore. 1977). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, noting initially that:
In a diversity action, a federal district court applies the law ofthe forum state. Not only the substantive law, but also
the conflicts of law rules of the forum are applied in diversity actions. Normally, this would automatically limit our
analysis to the law of Oregon since it is the forum state in the present case. However, the question presentedhere
carriesforeign relations overtones which may create an inference that this should not be decided merely by
reference to Oregon law.
597 F.2d at 1163 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). At this point, the court subtended a footnote:
The United States has entered into two tax treaties with Canada. Cf.Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, [376 U.S.
398,424-427 (1964)], where [the] Court found that the scope of the act of state doctrine was to be decided by reference
to federal rather than state law. But cf.Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Ark. 1973), where
the court noted that "suits of this kind necessarily involve to some extent the relations between the United States and
foreign governments and for thatreason perhaps should be governed by a single uniform rule," but then went on to apply
Arkansas state law. 367 F.Supp. at 1011-1012.
HerMajesty the Queen, 597 F.2d at 1163, n.2. (citations omitted).
53. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
54. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
55. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
56. See Hazen Research, 497 F.2d at 151. See also EUGENE F. SCOLES & PEMR HAY, CONFUCrOF LAWS 9991001 (2d ed. 1992).
57. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
58. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Here, the Supreme Court wrote:
"Although Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, contains some broad language about the relationship of reciprocity to
comity, the case in fact imposed a requirement of reciprocity only in regard to conclusiveness ofjudgments, and even
then only in limited circumstances."
Id. at 411. See also, HerMajesty the Queen, 597 F.2d at 1164 ("We recognize that the reciprocity requirement has
fallen into some disfavor," citing RESTATMENSECOND OF CONFLICrOFLAWS, § 98, Comment e.); Tahan v. Hodgson,
662 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 300 F. 741,747
(S.D.N.Y. 1924), affd, 267 U.S. 22 (1925).
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1. Enforcement of Tribal Judgments in State Courts
The hypothetical is this:
AB vs. CD in tribal court, judgment for AB.
Tribal appeal; affirmed.
AB vs. CD in Arkansas state court to enforce the tribal court judgment.
Most of the published Indian law cases involve this hypothetical, and, of course,
these cases come out of the state court systems.5 9 No consistent rule is established
by those cases and it is difficult to discern a trend. Other than establishing the rule

for the particular state involved, these cases do little to advance the discussion.6"
Sheppard, Buell, Jim, and Cowboy apply a form of full faith and credit, while the

others apply some form of comity.
As a group, these cases leave many more questions unanswered than answered:
Does 28 U.S.C. § 1738 require the state court to give full faith and credit to the tribal
judgment? Some cases so hold, usually under the theory that tribes are "territories"
of the United States under the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1738.61 Others reject the

application of that ambiguous language to tribes without clear legislative history
showing that was Congress's intent.62 Does full faith and credit apply under some

federal law other than U.S.C. § 1738, or under some state law? There are such
particular and carefully drafted federal laws that impose full faith and credit for
specific subject areas.63 When those specific subject areas are not involved in a case,
some courts find a "negative pregnant" and hold that full faith and credit does not
apply,' while others reject the "negative pregnant" theory. 65 Is some federal principle

other than full faith and credit applicable, or is recognition of tribal judgments purely

59. See, e.g. Halwood v. Cowboy Auto Sales, Inc., 946 P.2d 1088 (N.M. App. 1997); Mexican v. Circle Bear,
370 N.W. 2d737 (S.D. 1985); Desjarlaitv. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985);NWippertv.Blackfeet
Tribe, 654 P.2d 512 (Mont. 1982); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895 (Idaho 1982); Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293
N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1980); In re Buehl v. Anderson, 555 P.2d 1334 (Wash. 1976); Jim v. C.I.T. Fin. Serv., 533 P.2d
751 (N.M. 1975); Red Fox v. Red Fox, 542 P.2d 918 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975); In re Lynch's Estate, 337 P.2d 199 (Ariz.
1962).
60. See Wilson v. Marchington, 934 F.Supp. 1187 (D. Mont. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 127 F.3d 805 (9th
Cir. 1997). The lower court in Wilson noted:
A review of the decisional law relative to the recognition of tribal court judgments outside the boundaries of the
reservation reveals that the federal courts have not dealt with full faith and credit and comity issues between tribal
courts and federal and state courts in an in-depth manner.
Id. at 1190, n.6.
61. See Halwood v. Cowboy Auto Sales, Inc., 946 P.2d at 1090.
62. See Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W. 2d at 143.
63. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d)(full faith and credit under the Indian Child Welfare Act).
64. See, e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
65. See, e.g., Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 INDiANL. REP. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux 1997).
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a matter of state law? Most state courts that conclude they are not bound by 28
U.S.C. § 1738 unsurprisingly conclude that they are free of federal strictures and
apply state law.66
2. Enforcement of State Judgments in Tribal Courts
If the law coming out of the state courts forms no unified whole, the law from
tribal courts is obscure in a different way. While one suspects that there is more of
a trend toward the use of comity in tribal courts, it is difficult to verify that
assumption, as tribal common law is less accessible than is state common law. 67
68
Interestingly enough, the most famous tribal court case, Eberhardv. Eberhard,
from the Court of Appeals of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, is one of the few tribal
court cases that opts for a congressionally imposed full faith and credit regime.
3. Negotiation
The Eberhardcase shows the difficulty of the choice that must be made by a
tribal court presented with a state court judgment for recognition. At issuehere was
the future of a very young tribal member, whose father was litigating her custody in
tribal court while her mother was litigating her custody in California state court.6 9
In the published opinion, the court of appeals first determined that it was bound by
federal law generally to give full faith and credit to state judgments.7" While the
narrow holding interpreted the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act7 '
(PKPA), the structure of the opinion made it clear that the court considered the
broader requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to apply to the tribe.72 By the end of the
opinion, however, and using a creative reading of the PKPA, the court declined to
enforce the California decree.73
The attraction of full faith and credit to the Cheyenne River Sioux Court of
Appeals was clearly that, under its view of the PKPA, the courts of California would
have to give full faith and credit to the tribal court's custody decrees.74 This federally
mandated respect was so attractive to the tribal court that it considered the PKPA's
purported imposition on the unconsenting tribe to be an enhancement of tribal
sovereignty, a conclusion I disputed in the article cited above.
66. See, e.g., wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 654 P.2d 512 (Mont. 1982); Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139
(N.D. 1980).
67. Dean Newton has taken an important step to remedy this situation with herarticle, Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal
Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM INDIAN L. REV. 285 (1998).
68. 24 INDIANL. REP. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux 1997). For an unrestrained critique of that case, see Robert
Laurence, Full Faithand Creditin Tribal Courts: An Essay on TribalSovereignty, Cross-BoundaryReciprocity
and the Unlikely Case ofEberhardv. Eberhard,28 N.M. L. REV. 19 (1998).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. 28 U.S.C § 1738A.
72. See 24 INDIANL. REP. at 6064.
73. See id. at 6067-68.
74. See id. at 6066.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1999

17

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 35 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 1

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 35:1

I do not dispute, however, the desire for cross-boundary respect. The question
boils down to this: How much is a tribe willing to give up in terms of the discretion
its judges have when presented with state judgments, in order to ensure that the
judgments of those tribal judges will be respected by state courts? In views expressed
in more detail elsewhere,7 5 1 concluded that that question is better answered, not in the
litigation setting, but in negotiations between states and tribes, with the federal
government as an onlooker, but not as a decision maker. That is to say that tribal
judges, tribal councils or tribal chiefs, presidents, chairmen or governors should
negotiate with their counterparts in state government to determine how best to manage
the cross-boundary enforcement of judgments, choosing full faith and credit, comity
or some entirely new formulation as best fits their own governmental needs.
4. Asymmetry
A tribal judge once informally suggested over lunch that what would be best
fromhis point of view would be a regime where state courts would give his judgments
full faith and credit, but where he only had to give comity to incoming state court
judgments. I acknowledged the beauty of such a system from a tribal perspective and
the conversation moved on.
The judge's offhand suggestion, with tongue at least partly in cheek, struck some
at the lunch, and later, as so politically and theoretically insupportable as to be not
worth discussing, but it got me to thinking about the asymmetry involved in such a
solution. While I have come to agree that the lunchtime proposal is unworkable in
its directness, I have, since that day, become the most vocal proponent of an
asymmetric solution to the cross-boundary enforcement problem.
It is my view that fundamentally different concerns exist depending on whether
the judgment is incoming, from a tribal perspective, or outgoing: the tribal court is
most mindful of the public policy issues at work in the judgment presented for
enforcement, while the state court is most mindful of the fairness of the procedures
in the court that rendered the judgment. The reasons for this asymmetry are several.
First, tribes are generally so small and states are generally so large that the public
policies reflected in an incoming state judgment present greater threats to tribal
sensibilities than when the situation is reversed. Next, there is a federal check on
state court civil procedures, but none on tribal court procedures.7 6 Also, the United
States Constitution applies to state court procedures but not to tribal court
procedures," and finally, the economic realities are that more tribal members must
do business off-reservation than non-members on-reservations.
My reaction to the asymmetry of these needs is an asymmetric solution: that
full faith and credit not apply; that tribal courts have a comity-like discretion when

75. See P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence, Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faithand Credit Agreements: The
Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365 (1994).
76. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
77. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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presented with a state court judgment; that comity be more sensitive to local public
policy than is the case when a large and economically healthy state is presented with
a judgment from abroad; that the state court be permitted a "fairness check" under the
ICRA on the procedures used by the tribal court in granting the judgment.7"
5. Concluding Thoughts
There has been considerable debate, some of it intemperate, in recent years
among various Indian law scholars concerning the issues just addressed.7 9 Much of
the disagreement among us relates to the very different role that public policy plays
in full faith and credit and comity. Advocates of full faith and credit are willing to
put on-reservation sensibilities aside for the sake of the off-reservation recognition of
tribal court judgments. Advocates of comity see a greater threat to on-reservation
sensibilities in the tension between the policies supporting incoming judgments and
closely-held local norms, even while noting that most often, even under comity, the
incoming judgment is enforced.8" Advocates of asymmetry see more need for a public
policy exception when on-reservation enforcement of a state judgment is sought than
when off-reservation enforcement of a tribal judgment is sought, and furthermore, a
more sensitive public policy inquiry than is appropriate when the receiving
jurisdiction is large.81 I have recently offered a "reconciliation" that attempts to show
that both full faith and credit and comity are essentially asymmetric,"2 but advocates
of the symmetric versions of both of those are apt to see the "reconciliation" as an
attempt to get asymmetry into the room through the back door.
Without an experiment, it is difficult to predict what will actually happen. With
full faith and credit, will tribal courts become mere collection agencies for offreservation car dealers? Without full faith and credit, will every state court find some
reason not to enforce every tribal court judgment presented? Can the legal system
tolerate an asymmetric approach?
The experiment is in the works. In the absence of a definitive rule from the
United States Supreme Court, various states and tribes are reaching different
conclusions on the questions. Congress occasionally legislates the rule for certain
subject matter areas (for example, non-divorce child custody orders 3 ) but more often
leaves the choices for the state, tribal and federal courts. Some states and some tribes
have negotiated resolutions to the problem. These developments are mostly nascent,
and it is too soon to know whether one system is best for all situations. Only time

78. See Robert Laurence, The BothersomeNeedforAsymmetry inAny FederallyDictatedRule ofRecognition
for the Enforcement of Money Judgmentsacross Indian Reservation Boundaries,27 CONN. L. REV. 979 (1995).
79. The most accessible law review discussion is Richard E. Ransom et al.,Recognizing and EnforcingState and
TribalJudgments: A Roundtable Discussionof Law, Policy, andPractice, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 239 (1993).
80. See LE'LAR, supra note 23.
81. Correspondingly, asymmetrists, some of us anyway, see a greater need for the ICRA "fairness" check on an
outgoing tribal judgment than for a constitutional "fairness" check on an in-coming state judgment.
82. See Robert Laurence, The Convergenceof Cross-BoundaryEnforcementTheoriesinAmericanIndianLaw:
An Attempt to Reconcile FullFaithand Credit,Comity and Asymmetry, 18 QuINNmPA¢ L. REV. 115 (1998).
83. See 25 U.S.C. § 191 1(d)(full faith and credit under The Indian Child welfare Act of 1978).
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will tell.

With this lengthy background discussion, we may now turn to the precise topic
of this article: What role, if any, do and should the federal courts play in the cross-

reservation-boundary enforcement of judgments?
III. A FEDERAL COURT RECEIVING A TRIBAL COURT JUDGMENT FOR OFF-RESERVATION ENFORCEMENT: WILSON V. MARCHINGTON

84

The hypothetical is this:

AB vs. CD in tribal court; judgment for AB.
Tribal appeal; affirmed.
AB vs. CD in federal court to enforce the tribal court judgment off-

reservation.
Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires that AB and CD be
citizens of different states and that at least $75,000 be in controversy. AB's tribal

membership will not be enough to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction; there is no
specific federal diversity jurisdiction for law suits brought by non-Indians against
Indians, or vice versa, as there is when the parties are of diverse state or national

citizenship.85
84. The Montana federal district court wrote two opinions in the case of Wilson v. Marchinglon. Thefirst, found
at 934 F. Supp 1176 (D. Mont. 1995) addressed only the merits of the question of whether the tribal court had
jurisdiction over the underlying cause of action and the non-Indian defendant. After expressing considerable doubt that
the answer to that question either was, or should be, "yes," see Wilson, 934 F.Supp. 1181-86, the court determined that
it was required to follow the Ninth Circuit precedent found in Hinshaw v. Mahler, 42 F.3d 1178(9th Cir. 1994), see
Wilson, 934 F. Supp. at 1187. Thus, the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was granted. Id.
In the second opinion, found at 934 F.Supp. 1187 (D. Mont. 1996), the district court addressed the question ofwhether
itshould recognize and enforce, off-reservation, the tribal court'sjudgment, finding that itshould, id. This determination
was appealed by the defendant.
The Ninth Circuit, then, reversed the second district court opinion on the grounds initially stated by the first district court
opinion, holding that Hinshaw was effectively overruled by an extension of Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997), and was no longer binding precedent, 127 F.3d 805, 815 (9th Cir. 1997).
85. Sound policy might well support the creation of such jurisdiction, tribal members falling, as they do, nicely
between American citizens of different states and foreign nationals in terms of the general reception that they might
expect to receive when entering the courts away from their homelands.
Would it be constitutional for Congress to make such a change? In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1 (183 1), the Court held that the Cherokee Nation was not a "foreign nation" as that term is used in U.S. CoNs .
art. In, § 2, cI. 1. It likely follows that the Cherokees individually are not the "foreign... Citizens" mentioned in the
same clause. While it is true enough that occasions are rare where the Supreme Court has stricken a congressional
enactment as beyond the power granted by the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), the Court did just that in a case involving the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Seminole Tribe implicates the Eleventh Amendment, and the reform suggested above does not; nevertheless, it is
reasonably certain that the present Supreme Court would balk at the expansion of federal court jurisdiction to reach
cases brought by or against Indians. Cf. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582
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Does federal question jurisdiction exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1331? Applying
usual state-to-state enforcement of judgment law, AB's federal complaint would not
seem to give rise to a federal question, as she is only seeking federal court recognition. In the state-to-state situation, such recognition is considered to be only
indirectly related to, not "arising under" federal law.86
The second lower court opinion in Wilson v. Marchington,87 is to the contrary
when the judgment whose recognition is sought is from a tribal court. Wilson sued
Marchington in tribal court and won. The tribal appellate court affirmed. 8 Wilson
then sued in Montana federal district court to enforce the judgment off-reservation,
presenting exactly the situation contemplated by the present hypothetical. Wilson
alleged both diversity and federal question jurisdiction.8 9 The district court held that
both types of federal jurisdiction existed.9"
Why does it matter? In other words, why did the district court find it necessary
to hold that both kinds of jurisdiction exist when just one would do? In the first
place, diversity jurisdiction has a $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement, 9' so
small tribal judgments would not be enforceable in federal court if only diversity
jurisdiction existed, though that was not a problem in Wilson.
The District Court in Wilson thought it also mattered what the basis of
jurisdiction was in order to determine whether the court would follow a federal rule
regarding the recognition of tribal judgments, or had to follow Montana's rule of
recognition. The court thought that if diversity were the only grounds for federal
jurisdiction, then state, not federal, enforcement of judgment law would have to apply
under Erie.92
This is at least partly correct. It is correct to note that generally, there is no
federal enforcement of judgment law. Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires the federal court to use "the practice and procedure of the state in
which the district court is held."'93 Because of this, as mentioned above, most crossboundary enforcement actions are brought in state, not federal court, and federal
marshals do not execute civil judgments as a general matter. Even when they do, they
use state execution process.94
It is also correct, again as mentioned in the background discussion above, that
in the cross-national-boundaries situation, the usual rule is that in diversity cases,
under Erie, state, not federal, rules of comity control.95 There is an argument,
however, that when federal interests dominate, federal law should control, even in

(1949)(diversity jurisdiction as it applies to citizens of the District of Columbia).
86. See CHARLEs ALAN WRIGhfT et al., supranote 45 at 50.
87. 934 F.Supp. 1187 (D. Mont. 1996), rev'd on othergrounds, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
88. See Wilson, 934 F. Supp. at 1178, n.2.
89. See Wilson, 934 F. Supp. at 1189.
90. See ld. at 1189.
91. See 28 U.S.C.§ 1331.
92. See Wilson, 934 F. Supp. at 1191-92 (citing Kaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)).
93. Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a).
94. See discussion supra note 49.
95. See, e.g., McCord v. Jet Spray Int'l Corp., 874 F. Supp. 436 (D. Mass. 1994).
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diversity cases.96 Of course, it is Indian law dogma that, in this field of all fields,
federal interests dominate over state interests.
It is also correct that, in the cross-state-boundaries situation, diversity
jurisdiction must exist in order to use the federal courts to enforce out-of-state
judgments, unless there is some federal question involved other than full faith and
credit. As noted above, pleading the Full Faith and Credit Clause in a complaint does
not establish 28 U.S.C. § 1331 federal question jurisdiction.98 Additionally, in
diversity cases, Erie generally requires the use of state law. 99
The result in Klaxon v. StentorElectricManufacturing Co.,"'0 does not mean
that in diversity cases full faith and credit does not apply in the across-state-lines
situation. Just as the states themselves must apply the federal requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1738, federal full faith and credit is the rule in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 diversity
cases. 1 ' True enough, that does not make full faith and credit a 28 U.S.C. § 1331
"federal question." That is to say, it remains a federal question in diversity cases
whether the particular judgment is entitled to full faith and credit, even though the
same case does not present a federal question in the 28 U.S.C. § 1331 sense.
Thus the Wilson lower court's precise concern was misplaced. It could have
held the recognition question to be a federal one even if its jurisdiction were only
based on diversity of citizenship, and even if 28 U.S.C. § 1738 did not apply.
Notwithstanding Klaxon's holding that Erie requires federal courts to use state
conflicts law in diversity cases, the federal requirement of full faith and credit still
applies in those cases as a federal imposition on state law. Similarly, if the court had
held that federal interests dominate when a tribal judgment was involved, as the court
clearly believed, and following the suggestion of those non-Indian cases that have
made a parallel holding,'0 2 the court could have applied the federal rule in a diversity
case.
The Wilson district court wrote:
In view of the unique status occupied by Indian Tribes under our law,
I it is, in the opinion of this court, imperative, not only that a
uniform body of law develop in relation to the recognition and
enforcement of civil judgments rendered in the various tribal courts, but
that issues relating to the recognition and enforcement of the judgments
be resolved in accordance with federal law. In this fashion, disruption

96. See 8 CHAR
ALAN WRIGHTet al, supra note 45, § 4473 (1981& Supp. 1997) and cases cited therein.
See also Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir.
1979).
97. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
98. See Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48 (1904).
99. See Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
100. See id.
101. Cf.LEFLR, supranote 23, at 222 (while it is true that the full faith and credit mandates of28 U.S.C. § 1738
apply both to the state courts and to the federal courts in diversity cases, that does not necessarily mean that all aspects
ofresjudicata and preclusion have been federalized). See also Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946); Follette v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 41 F.3d 1234 (8th Cir. 1994).
102. See Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th
Cir. 1979).
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of the relationship between the various Indian Tribes and the United
States will be avoided."0 3
All of this is entirely sensible in my view, and good policy, required by most of
what we know as American Indian law. However, the lower court's next sentence is
more problematic based on the precedent:
Recognition of the existence of federal question jurisdiction over an
action prosecuted for the purpose of seeking recognition and enforcement of a tribal court judgment is compelled by the relationship extant
between the United States and the various Indian Tribes.' °4
The question is whether this sentence follows from the court's prior discussion.
As the state-to-state situation shows, the fact that federal law dominates the question
does not always mean that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction exists. It does not in the
across-state-borders situation when the only federal law implicated is the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and 28 U.S.C. § 1738. It requires some stretching of the nonIndian cross-boundary enforcement precedent to find that these questions are "federal
questions" in the 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdictional sense. It would have been enough
in Wilson for the district court to have found that in diversity cases the dominance of
federal Indian law concerns requires the application of a federal rule of recognition.
This, too, would have stretched current 28 U.S.C. § 1332 law, though less so than 28
U.S.C. § 1331 requires.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit in Wilson avoided the issue and seemed indifferent
about how the district court had obtained jurisdiction."0 5 The court did not mention
whether Wilson was proceeding under diversity or federal question jurisdiction, but
applied a federal rule of recognition." 6
As we will see by the end of this article, without the Wilson lower court's
holding that a suit to enforce a tribal court judgment in federal court raises a 28
U.S.C. § 1331 federal question, there will be only a small role for the federal courts
to play at all in cross-reservation-boundary enforcement issues. Otherwise, the
Wilson solution applies only in diversity cases, with the parties of diverse citizenship
and a sizeable amount of money in controversy. Without substantial reform of
various federal jurisdiction rules, the federal role will be a small one in this important
area of American Indian law, where the federal courts have traditionally been the
protectors of important privileges and prerogative. Of course, it must be pointed out
that the federal courts play only a small role in the cross-state-boundary enforcement
of judgments. The role is larger for federal courts in the enforcement of foreign
nation judgments, due to alienage diversity jurisdiction, but the federal courts still
apply state substantive law, including state rules of comity.
In terms of long-term law reform, one must think about the basic questions of
103.
104.
105.
106.

Wilson,934F.Supp.at 1191-92.
Id. at 1192.
127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
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what role the federal courts should play in this area, to what extent federal interests
control, and how much we should trust the state and tribal courts to serve those
federal interests. These questions will be addressed in the Conclusion. For now it is
enough to note that the lower Wilson holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 applies in the
cross-boundary enforcement situation is rather novel, and litigants are sure to face
resistance from the federal courts in advancing the theory, based on the non-Indian

analogies.
In conclusion, ifAB and CD are of diverse state citizenship andAB's tribal court
judgment is for at least $75,000, AB may use the federal courts to enforce the
judgment off-reservation. In such a diversity action, a straightforward application of
Erie, backed up by the usual non-Indian rules, will result in the federal court using
the state enforcement of judgment law. The better result will be Wilson's, holding
that it will be a question of federal law whether the tribal judgment is entitled to
recognition.
If AB and CD are citizens of the same state or AB's judgment is small, there is
an argument based on the lower court opinion in Wilson, that AB may use the federal
court system for off-reservation enforcement, using a federal rule of recognition.
This argument is based upon sound policy, but the non-Indian precedent is less
strong.
In order to invoke federal court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, there must
be a federal cause of action.'0 7 In this case, that cause of action will be based on the
tribal judgment itself, and the rule that applies when tribal court judgments are
presented for enforcement in off-reservation courts. The prior discussion addressed
the various forms those rules might take: full faith and credit, comity and some
asymmetric version of either.10 8 The question for the federal court becomes whether
that rule is governed by federal statute, most obviously 28 U.S.C. § 1738, by the
federal common law, or by state statutory or common law.
The Ninth Circuit in Wilson made asymmetric, non-reciprocal comity the rule
of recognition in the federal courts of that Circuit." 9 The court rather quickly
dismissed the argument that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 applies to tribal court judgments,
noting that neither Indians, Indian tribes, nor Indian tribal courts are mentioned in the
statute." 0 The court also declined to be bound by the rule of Montana, where the
federal law suit was brought."' The Ninth Circuit, however, did not adopt the lower
court's view that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 created federal court jurisdiction for all actions
enforcing tribal judgments, nor did it require the states of the Ninth Circuit to follow
the federal rule, which it said applied in federal courts within the circuit. It rejected
full faith and credit as well as the analogy to comity as it applies to foreign-nation

107. See American Well Works v. Layne and Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257(1916). The 28 U.S.C. § 1331 question
is whether the cause of action arises under federal law. According to Justice Holmes' famous, if not particularly helpful,
formulation, "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." Id. at 260.
108. See supranotes 59-83 and accompanying text.
109. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1997).
110. Id.at808-09.
111. Id. at 813.
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judgments, which would have traditionally required more federal court deference to
2 Here, Montana's rule is specifically retaliatory,
the Montana's state rule of comity. 11
but the Ninth Circuit rejected retaliation as part of the federal rule, thus allowing for
the possibility that the federal courts would enforce a Blackfeet
judgment, even
11 3
judgments.
federal
enforcing
not
are
courts
Blackfeet
the
though
All of the academic participants at the "Roundtable" held some years ago at the
American Indian Law Center agreed that the rule of recognition for these cases should
be a federal one.114 Former Chief Justice Ransom of the Supreme
Court of New
5
recognition.1
of
rule
state
a
desired
Mexico understandably
It is interesting to note that Professor Robert N. Clinton of the University of
Iowa, one of the principal proponents of full faith and credit and the apparent author
of the Eberhardopinion, 116 opposed the use of comity, at least partly because comity
is conventionally treated as a feature of state common law. The federal doctrine of
comity is applicable under Hilton only when a foreign-nation judgment is presented
to a federal court having 28 U.S.C. § 1331 federal question jurisdiction. While the
opposite result has been urged, Hilton-style federal comity, unlike federal full faith
and credit, does not preempt a state's version of comity either in an Erie-based federal
diversity case, or in a state court case. Professor Clinton thought that if comity
controlled the Indian law question, it would automatically follow that any federal rule
governing the cross-boundary enforcement of tribal judgments would
only apply, like
117
Hilton, in cases where there was 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction.
This observation was prescient, as the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Wilson shows.
Having established for sound reasons that asymmetric, non-retaliatory comity should
be the federal rule, the court gave no hint that it thought that federal rule would
preempt Montana's state law regime of symmetric, retaliatory comity."'
But why should that be? Indian law requires one to think "outside the box."
The adoption of some form of comity regime should not carry along with it all of the
jurisdictional baggage that encumbers comity in the foreign-nation situation. The
questions are separate. First, should the federal rule be comity, full faith and credit,
or something else? Second, should whatever rule that is chosen bind the state courts

112. See Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3dCir. 1971).
113. See wilson, 127 F.3dat811-12.
114. See Richard E.Ransom etal.,
Recognizing and Enforcing State and Tribal Judgments: A Roundtable
Discussion of Law,Policy, and Practice, 18 Au. INDIANL. REV. 239 (1993).
115. Under the law of New Mexico in place at that time and reinforced since, federal full faith and credit applies
to the recognition by New Mexico state courts of tribal judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and the holding that tribes
are"territories"under that statute. See Jim v. C.I.T. Fin. Serv., 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975)(illustrating the casein place
at the time of the Roundtable); Halwoodv. Cowboy Auto Sales, Inc., 946 P.2d 1088 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997)(marking
the intermediate appellate court case that was decided after the Roundtable). No comment at the Roundtable indicated
that Chief Justice Ransom was committing himself to a reconsideration of that case, nor that he had predetermined his
vote on any such reconsideration.
116. "Apparent" because the Eberhard opinion is per curiam. Nevertheless, it is commonly understood in the
academic world that Professor Clinton, an Associate Justice on the Cheyenne River Sioux Court ofAppeals, wrote the
opinion. The opinion is clearly based on an argument flrstpresented in MONROEPICE&ROBERTN. CL1NrN, LAWAND
T-EAMERICAN INmm 357 (2d ed. 1982).

117. See id.at255.
118. It is difficult to cite authority for this silence in the Ninth Circuit's Wilson opinion. The existence of this
undiscussed conclusion supports Professor Clinton's fear of what will become of any rule except full faith and credit.
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as well as the federal courts? To say that choosing comity as the answer to the first
question predetermines the answer to the second question is a non sequiturin Indian
law, a field in which straightforward analogies are traditionally subject to a harsh
reception. Tribes are not "like" anything; not Puerto Rico or the Mariana Islands or
Alaska before it became a state; not like some private voluntary organization such as
the Anti-Defamation League or the Boy Scouts; not like Kosovo or Tibet or the
Vatican or East Timor or Kuwait during the Gulf War or Hungary during the Turkish
occupation. They are not even much like their pre-Columbian selves anymore, at
least not under the domestic law of the United States."1 9
In general, comity may well be a federal rule to which the Supremacy Clause
does not attach when foreign-nation judgments are involved. Whatever the merits of
that conclusion, it does not determine the answer when tribal judgments are involved.
Professor Clinton may be right, as the Ninth Circuit's Wilson opinion shows, that
when one suggests "comity" as the Indian law rule, a non-careful listener may
suppose that one is suggesting that the Supremacy Clause need not apply. The way
to avoid this unhappy result is to avoid using the word "comity" when proposing the
rule, even if the proposed rule is very much like traditional comity. Perhaps a better
name would be "the federal rule of recognition," thereby at least leaving open the
supremacy question rather than appearing to assume the answer in advance.

119. I am speaking here ofwhat tribes are "like" under the present domestic law ofthe United States. The inaptness
of analogies under that body of law is to be distinguished from what tribes might be "like" under their own domestic
laws, or what they might be "like" under the domestic laws of any other nation, or what they might be "like" under
developing international law. I have had the pleasure of listening recently to Professor Rice of the University of Tulsa
College of Law speak broadly of the future course that Indian law might take, using a Kosovar analogy, G. William
Rice, "Imagining the Cherokee People in the Year 3000" (remarks made at the Sixth Annual University of Arkansas
Native American Symposium, November 8, 1999).
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IV. A FEDERAL COURT RECEIVING A STATE COURT JUDGMENT FOR120ONRESERVATION ENFORCEMENT: ANNIS V. DEWEY COUNTY BANK

The hypothetical is this one:

AB v. CD in state court; judgment for AB.
State court appeal; affirmed.
CD v. AB in federal court to enjoin the on-reservation enforcement of the state
court judgement.
InAnnis v. Dewey County Bank,121 the bank recovered judgment in state court

on a contract claim. The defendant, a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe,
did not pay voluntarily, and pursuant to the plaintiffs writ of execution, the county
sheriff attempted to execute judgment against the defendant's cattle, located onreservation. Annis, the original defendant, then sued in federal court to enjoin
execution of the judgment against his on-reservation cattle. The Bank counterclaimed in federal 22court on the state court judgment, seeking compensatory and

punitive damages. 1
The court held that state process could not occur on-reservation and issued the
injunction. On the counter-claim, however, the court gave full faith and credit to the
state court judgment, and sent the federal marshal out to seize the cattle."2 No
punitive damages were allowed.124
I have written elsewhere at length on this problem, arguing that the Annis
decision was incorrect. 1"5 True enough, replacing the county sheriff with the federal
marshal solves some of the jurisdictional aspects of the problem; while state officers
have no authority on-reservation without tribal agreement, federal officers are
commonly there enforcing various federal criminal laws. 126 But merely replacing one
27
officer with another does not solve all of the problems presented by Williams v. Lee'
and the tribe's right "to make its own laws and be ruled by them." 2 8 TheAnnis court
ignored the crucial impact of Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with

120. 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971).
121. Id.
122. See id. at 134.
123. See id. at 138.
124. See id.
125. Robert Laurence, The Enforcement ofJudgments acrossIndian Reservation Boundaries:Full Faith and
Credit,Comity and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L. REv. 589, 607-47 (1990).
126. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1152.

127.

358 U.S. 217 (1959).

128.

Id. at 220.
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its blanket incorporation of state enforcement process into federal law.'29 Take the
question of whether Annis's cattle are exempt. Suppose they are under the law of the
tribe, but that they are not under the law of South Dakota. Williams would surely
include within its protection of the tribe's right to make its own law, its right to make
its own exemption law. However, under Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Annis, South Dakota's exemption law will apply instead.
Should the federal rule-makers amend Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to incorporate tribal process for on-reservation enforcement (a good idea),
or even amend the rule clearly so as to replace tribal enforcement law with state
enforcement law (a bad one), then the federal court might take anAnnis-like case with
no Williams qualms. Until that time, a federal court should decline to use Rule 69
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and state law to enforce a state judgment onreservation, even in a diversity case, referring the plaintiff instead to the tribal court
system.
Now to the "doubly indirect collateral review" category of cases where all three
court systems come into play.
V. COLLATERAL ATrACKS IN FEDERAL COURT ON A STATE COURT ENFORCEMENT ACTION CONCERNING A TRIBAL COURT JUDGMENT

A.

Where the State CourtRefuses to Enforce the Tribal Court Judgment
The hypothetical is this:
AB vs. CD in tribal court; judgment for AB.
Tribal appeal; affirmed.
AB vs. CD in state court to enforce the judgment; denied.
AB vs. CD in federal court to mandate state court enforcement.

First, by necessity, consider the jurisdiction of the federal district court.
Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 will lie if the parties are diverse and
if the amount in controversy is over $75,000. Federal questionjurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 will lie if the question of when a state court must enforce a tribal court
judgment is governed by federal law.
As discussed above, all of the law professors at the "Roundtable" thought that
this must be a question of federal law. 13 Professor Clinton, however, was clearly

129.
130.

Once again, no citation is available to draw the readers attention to the opinion's silence on this crucial issue.
See Ransom, supra note 3, at 277.
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concerned that, if the rule were not full faith and credit under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, then
it would not be governed by federal law, except in the rare 28 U.S.C. § 1331 cases,
where there was some federal question beyond the federal rule of recognition. In this
way, Professor Clinton bolstered his argument that symmetric full faith and credit
should be the law. 3 1 Wilson supports his gloomy outlook, at least to the extent that
the Ninth Circuit seemed to be adopting a federal rule for its own district courts while
not suggesting that the same federal rule must apply in state courts within the Circuit.
Note the complexity of thejurisdictional question: Saying that there is a federal
rule of recognition for the enforcement of tribal judgments in state courts, will not,
by itself, mean that tribal judgments can be enforced in federal courts directly under
28 U.S.C. § 1331. It could mean, however, that the federal rule will apply in
diversity cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, though most of the precedent is the other
way. Both of these conclusions were discussed above.13 2 But under the present
hypothetical, the result is more dramatic. It means thatAB may use 28 U.S.C. § 1331
jurisdiction in federal court, not to sue on the judgment itself, but to challenge the
state court's refusal to follow the federal rule.
AB's federal cause of action here would be under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a
deprivation, under color of state law, of rights guaranteed under federal law. The
state trial court is the state actor, and the federal law being violated to AB's detriment
is the federal rule of recognition.
Federal court abstention under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris,133 however,
will be a substantial barrier to AB. Ordinarily, the federal courts do not allow
collateral federal attacks upon on-going state litigation. Younger was a federal case
challenging an ongoing state criminal proceeding, but the theory has made some
substantial incursions into the ability of the federal courts to restrain state civil
process as well. 134 I have discussed at length elsewhere the theory under which AB
might persuade the federal court to ignore Younger in order to allow a collateral
attack on state enforcement process alleged to be in violation of federal law, 35 but I
concede here that, as federal court respect for state prerogatives is on the rise, 136 such
theory is a little unlikely to prevail.
If Younger abstention applies, the federal district court will dismiss AB's
collateral attack on the state proceeding to enforce the tribal judgment. That
enforcement proceeding will then go to final judgment at the state level, after which
its finality will have preclusive effect on any possible federal litigation other than
13 7
application for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.

131. See id.at 255.
132. See supranotes 88-104 and accompanying text.
133.
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
134. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
135. See Robert Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries:FullFaith
and Credit,Comity and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L. REv. 589, 612-20 (1990).
136. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
137. Cf. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923). These two cases establish the so-called "Rooker-Feldman" doctrine, which has become something
ofa fashion dujouroflate among federaljurisdictionists. For example, the May 1999 issues of the Notre Dame Law
Review is devoted entirely to the doctrine. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Foreward: Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the
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Now one can see the true importance of the holding in the lower Wilson court
that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction exists in a case seeking federal court enforcement
of a tribal court judgment. If the applicable rule of recognition is a federal one (as
most other commentators, including myself, as well as the federal district judge in
Wilson think it must be), but if the only enforcement actions that can be brought in
federal court are diversity cases, then many tribal court judgment creditors, especially
those with small judgments, would have to proceed in state court. And if the state
court is insistent upon applying its own state rule of recognition, rather than the
federal rule, the only hope for the creditor, aside from the risky certiorarito the
United States Supreme Court, would be this "doubly indirect collateral attack" in
federal court, where Younger represents a substantial barrier to effective federal court
supervision of the application of the federal rule.
In the Conclusion, I will set forth a preference for doubly indirect collateral
attack, with a concomitant modification of Younger, over a system that makes the
federal courts the primary forum for the enforcement of judgments.
B. Where the State CourtAgrees to Enforce the Tribal Court Judgment
The hypothetical is this:
AB vs. CD in tribal court; judgment for AB.
Tribal appeal; affirmed.
AB vs. CD in state court to enforce the tribal court judgment; granted.
CD vs. AB in federal court to block state enforcement.
This issue essentially collapses into the issue presented by cases such as
13 9
Montana v. United States38 and Strate v. A-1 Contractors
regarding federal
common law limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of tribal courts. The only
possible objection that CD could have under federal law to the state's decision to
enforce the tribal court judgment is that the judgment was rendered without
jurisdiction under federal common law. Thus, CD would have to mount a Montanabased attack on tribal jurisdiction. Federal court jurisdiction would be based on 28
U.S.C. § 1331, and the federal cause of action would emanate from the federal
common law. This combination was explicitly held to be proper jurisdictional

Powder to Blow It Up?, 74 NOTRE DAhs L. REV.. 1081 (1999); Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the
Trenches: The Rooker-FeldmanDoctrine inAction, 74 NoamEDAtMEL.REv. 1085 (1999); Barry Friedman &James
E. Gaylord, Rooker-Feldman, From The Ground Up, 74 NOTRE DAMvE L. REV. 1129 (1999); Susan Bandes, The
Rooker-FeldmanDoctrine: EvaluatingIts JurisdictionalStatus, 74 NoTREDAMmL. REv. 1175 (1999); Jack M.
Beermann, Comments on Rooker-Feldmanor Let State Law Be OurGuide, 74 NOIREDAM L. REv. 1209 (1999).
138. 450U.S. 544 (1981).
139. 520U.S.438 (1997).
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grounds in National Farmer'sUnion v. Crow Tribe of Indians.14"
There are now two abstention issues. First, National Farmers Union would
require that tribal process be exhausted, as it has been in the present hypothetical.
Second, Younger abstention cautions the federal court not to take the case away from
state court, where, presumably, the state judges will get the federal law right.
If Younger applies, the federal court will dismiss CD's case, and CD will have
to appeal through the state system, and seek review in the United States Supreme
Court. If Younger does not apply, the federal court will listen to the collateral attack
and judge the case under the standards set out by Montana and Strate.
It should be clear that CD does not get "two bites at the apple." That is to say,
CD should be able to mount either, but not both, a direct federal collateral attack on
the underlying jurisdiction of the tribal court a la Strate, or a doubly indirect federal
collateral attack in or on AB' off-reservation enforcement action, as discussed here.
If CD chooses the former and loses, collateral estoppel should prevent relitigation of
the issue a second time in or on the enforcement action.'41
A few words about the phrase "in or on." In some ways, that is the important
question here: Whether a challenge under federal law to the underlying tribal court
jurisdiction should come within, i.e., as a part of AB's state court enforcement action,
or on, i.e., collaterally in federal court, attacking the state court enforcement action.
In the rubric of the present article, an attack in the enforcement action is "indirect
collateral review," while an attack on the enforcement is a "doubly indirect collateral
review." Younger places a substantial barrier to the latter; the place for the attack on
tribal court jurisdiction is in the off-reservation enforcement action, if any. That
would leave, as the only legitimate "direct collateral attack" on jurisdiction, the
situation where CD, the tribal court defendant, has on-reservation property, as, did
the defendant in National Farmers Union. That leads one to observe that property
kept on-reservation might be considered consent to enforcement against that property
by tribal authorities, pursuant to tribal judgments, an observation consistent with the
dominant society's concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 42 This observation is
appealing, but seems inconsistent with the tack the Supreme Court has taken in cases
such as Oliphant,Montana,Bourland,and Strate. Of course, if CD'sproperty is onreservation due to contractual relationships with the tribe or its members, then under
Montana, tribal jurisdiction over CD exists and a collateral attack on it, whether
"direct" or in the enforcement action, should fail.

140. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
141. This is similar to the situation that obtains when enforcement is sought across state lines. As a general matter,
ajudgment obtained in the first state without proper personal jurisdiction over the defendant is not enforceable in the
second state. However, if the defendant litigated the jurisdictional question in the first state and lost, the remedy is to
appeal through the state court system and seek certiorarito the United States Supreme Court. Hence, it is only when
the first judgment was by default that the defendant may seek collateral review ofthe jurisdictional holding of the first
court. See LEFLARsupra note 23 at 39.
142. See generally Shafferv. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,210 n. 36(1977). ForagoodgeneraldiscussionofShaffer,
see Michael B. Mushlin, The New Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction:New York's Revival of a Doctrine Whose Time Has
Passed,55 BROOK. L. REv. 1059 (1990). For a list of other articles on Shaffer, see id. at 1061 n.13. For a student
comment attempting to refute Professor Mushlin's position, see Holly S. Haskew, Comment, Shaffer, Burnham and
New York's Continuing Use of QIR-2 Jurisdiction:A Resurrectionofthe PowerTheory, 45 EMoRYL.J. 239 (1996).
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VI. COLLATERAL ATrACKS INFEDERAL COURT ON ATRIBAL COURT ENFORCEMENT ACTION CONCERNING ASTATE COURT JUDGMENT
A.

Where the Tribal Court Refuses to Enforce the State CourtJudgment
The situation is now reversed and the hypothetical is this:
AB vs. CD in state court; judgment for AB.
State appeal; affirmed.
AB vs. CD in tribal court to enforce the state court judgment; denied.
CD vs. AB in federal court to mandate tribal court enforcement.

If the parties are diverse and the state judgment is at least $75,000, the federal
court's jurisdiction will be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332. If the parties are not diverse,
or thejudgment is small, jurisdiction must be found under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, if at all.
I have discussed above in another context the question of whether the federal rule of
recognition can support 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction, and found it to be possible,
143
but a stretch.
In any event, CD has no federal cause of action. Suits against tribes must be
supported by specific statutory authority, and the only one that comes to mind in this
instance is the due process requirement imposed by the ICRA on tribal court
proceedings. But Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez"4 held that the ICRA did not
create a federal cause of action for suit in federal court.
B.

Where the Tribal Court Agrees to Enforce the State Court Judgment

The hypothetical is this:
AB vs. CD in state court; judgment for AB.
State appeal; affirmed.
AB vs. CD in tribal court to enforce the state court judgment; granted.

143.
144.

See supranotes 87-104 and accompanying text.
436 U.S. 49,72(1978).
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CD vs. AB in federal court to block tribal court enforcement.

This case is the other side of NationalFarmersUnion and would appear to be
related to Williams v. Lee; 45 CD's theory to block enforcement evidently is that the
state judgment is invalid under federal law because it was beyond the power of the
state court to hear the underlying law suit.
If the parties are diverse and the state court judgment is at least $75,000, then
28 U.S.C. § 1332 diversity jurisdiction exists. For jurisdiction to exist under 28
U.S.C. § 1331, CD's federal court complaint must arise under federal law.
Presumably it does, as the complaint will have to allege the invalidity of the
underlying judgment under Williams v. Lee.
But is the reliance on Williams v. Lee enough to win the case, even if it states
a question arising under federal law? May not a tribal court, under tribal law, agree
to enforce a judgment that is invalid under federal law? Perhaps CD could concoct
an argument that would turn the tribal court's willingness to enforce a judgment
invalid under Williams v. Lee into an ICRA due process violation. No other federal
law would seem to prevent the tribe's determination to forgo its Williams v. Lee
protection. In any event, Martinez would seem to be an insurmountable barrier to
any federal ICRA suit to challenge the tribe's decision to recognize the judgment.
VII. CONCLUSION

In summation, under one view of what has gone before, there is not much of a
role for the federal courts to play in the enforcement of tribal judgments offreservation, or of state judgments on a reservation. For some, that will be nicely
symmetric, for, as shown above, there is not much of a role for the federal courts in
the cross-state-boundaries or cross-national-boundaries situations. In all three cases,
diversity jurisdiction might exist, but many parties with presumptively valid
judgments will not be able to meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Even if diversity jurisdiction exists in the foreign judgment situation, the state
rule of comity applies. In the state judgment situation, federal full faith and credit
will apply. At this time, the tribal judgment situation is suspended between these two
analogies, with the Ninth Circuit's Wilson case holding that tribal judgments are more
like foreign judgments, and the Cheyenne River Sioux Court of Appeals' Eberhard
case holding that tribal judgments are more like state judgments.
If diversity jurisdiction does not exist, then the tribal court plaintiff must try to
show 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction, or trust its fate to the state courts. The Montana
federal district court in Wilson held that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction exists when
a tribal judgment is presented to a federal court for enforcement, a result that is in
sharp contrast to the state judgment situation, and for which there is only scant
authority in the foreign judgment situation. The Ninth Circuit did not directly address

145.

358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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the issue, but would seem to disagree, not because of the reversal, which was on other
grounds, but because the Circuit was so reluctant to declare its rule of recognition to
be a federal rule binding on the states. If the Ninth Circuit's rule is not binding on the
states, then it is difficult see how it could be grounds for 28 U.S.C. § 1331
jurisdiction. And, without 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction, the federal courts will not
be enforcing most tribal court judgments.
Here is what ought to happen, beginning with a few fundamental principles.
First principle: The rule of recognition for the enforcement of tribal judgments
off-reservation or the enforcement of statejudgments on-reservation must be a federal
rule, binding on state, federal and tribal courts.
Second principle: States and tribes should be able to opt out of this otherwise
uniform federal rule by negotiated agreement. My usual authority is by analogy to
11 U.S.C. § 522(b), a federal bankruptcy rule that allows states to opt out of an
otherwise uniform federal rule for exemptions in bankruptcy. The reason for 11
U.S.C. §533(b)'s existence is the same as the reason here: Exemption law is a matter
of potent local concern, and Congress was reluctant to over-ride those concerns for
the sake of national uniformity, even in the face of a constitutional requirement that
it enact a "uniform" bankruptcy code.146 Similarly, states and tribes who put together
a cross-boundary enforcement regime that works for them should be able to opt out
of the federal version.
Third principle: There must be a role for the federal courts in the enforcement
of judgments across reservation lines. The Wilson lower court's solution is to make
all tribal judgments enforceable in the federal court. This is not a particularly
attractive option because: (1) the federal courts do not generally enforce judgments,
(2) when they do, they simply send the federal marshal to enforce state law, (3) the
solution doesn't work for the on-reservation enforcement of state judgments, (4) any
such large-scale expansion of federal court caseload is probably impractical to
contemplate, and (5) the lower Wilson holding is too much of a stretch of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 principles.
The more appropriate role for the federal courts is what I have called "doubly
indirect collateral review," where the federal courts are reviewing enforcement actions
in the state or tribal courts, rather than enforcing those judgments themselves. First,
take the case of the off-reservation enforcement of final tribal judgments. The
primary forum for off-reservation enforcement should be the state courts, although
federal courts could still take diversity cases. To show due respect to the state court
system, federal courts should abstain from hearing any challenge to the state court
enforcement procedure until the party resisting enforcement has exhausted all state
appeals and has been denied certiorariby the Supreme Court. But, unlike Younger
abstention, the federal court should not dismiss a premature collateral attack on the
state process, nor should the federal court find itself precluded regarding the
application of the federal rule of recognition by the state court's determination of the
146. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl.4. See ROBEPTL.JoRDON, et aL., BANKRUpICY 50-53 (5th ed. 1999). Most states,
when given the chance, quickly opted out of the federal exemption scheme. See id.
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issue in the enforcement action.1 47 Rather, the federal court should wait until the state
court system has had its say about the enforceability of the tribal court judgment, then
take the case for collateral review. The uniqueness of federal-state-tribal relations
justifies this unusual kind of abstention. In the unlikely event that the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari, the collateral attack would be moot.
Furthermore, it seems that all of the issues that are available in the Strate class
of cases could be raised in this federal challenge to the state enforcement action. As
such, they should be raised only there, not independently. The Strate-style of attack
on the jurisdiction of the tribal court is available in this collateral review of the state
enforcement action, as the Ninth Circuit's Wilson opinion showed, because the
existence, or lack of jurisdiction in the underlying action is an issue under both comity
and full faith and credit. The only "direct collateral" attack that would remain would
be where the tribal court plaintiff seeks to enforce the judgment on-reservation. Here
I would allow an ICRA attack on the tribal process in preference to a Montanaattack
on the existence of jurisdiction itself, a result that would require an exception to
148
Martinez, and a limitation of Strate.
Now take the case of a final state court judgment where enforcement is sought
on-reservation. The only forum available for on-reservation enforcement should be
the tribal court system. The federal courts should not even take diversity cases, as
they would, under present Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, be
sending the federal marshals to apply state enforcement law on the reservation,
contrary to Williams v. Lee. Therefore, the only federal forum here would be a
doubly indirect collateral one, challenging the tribal enforcement process as it applies
to a state court judgment. Here the federal court should abstain, consistent with
National Farmers Union, until the tribal court system has finished its inspection of
the enforceability of the off-reservation judgment. Another exception to Martinezis
needed to allow the federal court to inquire into the ICRA compliance in the tribal
procedure. Part of the ICRA due process should be the requirement that the tribe
follow the federal rule of recognition.
There is an interesting similarity between Younger, NationalFarmers Union
and Martinez. They are all in the nature of federal comity toward state and tribal
courts, and they all make sense, at least in our peculiar tri-partite federalist system.
National Farmers Union is the dominant case, as it requires exhaustion of tribal
(and, by implication, state) remedies before the federal courts step in. Younger and
Martinez show a heady and admirable respect by the federal courts toward the ability
of state and tribal judges, respectively, to get the federal law correct. However, they
can be overdone, and, as proposed here, some narrow exceptions are needed to keep
the federal courts in play with regard to the application of the federal rule of
recognition in state and tribal courts.

147.
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Fourth principle: What should the federal rule of recognition be? More than
enough has been written on that issue. Briefly, offered here is an asymmetric view:
The federal rule of recognition should allow a tribal court receiving a state court
judgment to inspect (1) the merits of the underlying law suit, and (2) the existence,
or not, of state jurisdiction, but not (3) the state court's conformity with the
Constitution. The first of these is justified by the impact that the off-reservation
judgment could have on closely held customs and traditions in the small tribal
community. The second is an accepted aspect of both comity and full faith and
credit. The third inquiry is better done using off-reservation federal courts whose
specialty is the Constitution. The other branch of the federal rule of recognition
should allow a state court receiving a tribal judgment to inspect (1) the existence, or
lack, of tribal court jurisdiction, as well as (2), the ICRA compliance, but not (3), the
underlying merits of the law suit which gave rise to the judgment. The first of these
is, again, an aspect of both comity and full faith and credit. The second is required
by Martinezsholding that makes the collateral enforcement challenge the only ICRA
check outside the tribal court system itself. The third inquiry is unnecessary, because
49
the threat to very large states by the judgments from small tribes is minimal.
That is what should happen; here is what probably will happen:
The cases, it would appear, are unlikely to evolve toward such a coherent
common law system. Thesereforms must come, if at all, via congressional legislation
and state-tribal negotiation. If left to their own devices, the cases are likely to create
a result less agreeable than that just described:
1. There will likely be only a little role for the federal courts to play, as in the
enforcement of judgments generally.
2. There will be a spotty adoption of full faith and credit, using either
Eberhard'shyper-technical reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1738, or Jim's holding that tribes
are "territories" of the United States. Neither does 28 U.S.C. § 1738 justice.
3. More commonly, courts will adopt a comity regime, with state comity rules
differing from the federal comity rule. This is the Wilson result.
4. We will see much retaliation, similar to Montana's rule, at issue in Wilson.
There is a certain history of retaliation in Indian-European affairs dating back at least
to RoanokeIsland. Without calmer heads prevailing, we are in for more "retaliation,"
the word, one hopes, meaning something different in the twenty-first century from
what it meant in the nineteenth.
Is that a livable system? Probably. But it is not to the advantage of either
judgment creditors, judgment debtors, tribal courts, state courts or federal courts.
The better course is one of state-tribal negotiation, with federal courts playing a
substantial role in the enforcement process until those negotiations are complete.

149. For a more complete discussion, see Robert Laurence, The Convergenceof Cross-BoundaryEnforcement
Theories in American Indian Law: An Attempt to Reconcile Full Faithand Credit,Comity and Asymmetry, 18
QumWIAcL.REv. 115 (1998).
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